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CASE NOTES
Commercial Law—Uniform Commercial Code—Applicability to Fed-
eral Public Contracts.—In the Matter of the Appeal of Reeves Sound-
craft Corp.'—Reeves contracted with the Marine Corps to deliver fifty
reels of magnetic tape. The tape was delivered but the Government refused
to accept delivery, alleging that the goods did not meet the standard warranted
by appellant. Reeves appeals from the default termination of the contract
and the excess cost assessment levied when the Government purchased
another brand of tape. The facts showed that one reel had been delivered
gratis before the contract was let, and that the Government had made a
superficial test of it. Appellant sought to rely on the Uniform Sales Act
(USA),2
 while the Government submitted that both the USA and the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) should be considered3 in determining the appeal.
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals found that though neither
has been enacted into federal law, both should be considered in the disposition
of the case. After discussing the lack of precedents, the Board found that
"the Code governs as reflecting the best in modern decision and discussion
and, in the implied warranty area, as reflecting a long-term trend toward
expansion of implied warranties."4
 The Board concluded, however, that it
made no difference whether the USA or the UCC controlled, since the decision
reached would be the same under both. HELD: Atly implied warranty for
fitness was removed by the Government's prior examination which, if made
carefully, should have revealed the inherent defects.
The instant case is one of many decisions which have attempted to
prescribe the law governing contracts and other commercial transactions
between private individuals and the federal government. Among the first
was the leading case of Swift v. Tyson,3
 in which Mr. Justice Story set a
long-lived standard which, as interpreted by Mr. Justice Brandeis, held that
federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground of diversity need
1
 ASBCA Nos. 9030 & 9130 (1964) (mimeographed), 33 U.S.L. Week 2024 (June
30, 1964).
2
 Ibid.
3
 Brief for Appellee, p. 8, n.5.
4
 Reeves Soundcraft Corp., supra note 1, at 15. The relevant sections of the UCC
are §§ 2-315 and 2-316(3)(b):
§ 2-315. Implied Warranty; Fitness for Particular Purpose.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless ex-
cluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
§ 2-316(3)(b):
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) . . .
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the
goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination
ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him. . . .
5 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of
the State as declared by its highest court; they are free to exercise
an independent judgment as to what the laW is—or should be.6
The importance of this reservation by Mr. Justice Story of commercial liti-
gation in federal courts within the ambit of federal law has increased with
the complexity of modern commerce.
The theory underlying the decisions emanating from Swift, however, was
sharply assailed by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.' Mr. Justice Brandeis, speak-
ing for a divided court, described the shortcomings that had become apparent
from the use of the Swift doctrine, and stated;
[E]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case [in the federal
courts] is the law of the State. . . There is no federal general com-
mon law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of com-
mon law applicable in a State whether they be local in nature or
"general," be they commercial law or a part of the'law of torts.
(Emphasis supplied.) 8
Although this decision ended the rule of "federal common law" in diversity
suits between private parties in the federal courts, Mr. Justice Brandeis
explicitly excluded from the operation of the Erie rule litigation involving
actions taken pursuant to the Constitution or Acts of Congress. Since any
action taken by the federal government must arise out of powers derived
from the Constitution or Acts of Congress, it is still federal law and not
state law which applies when the government is a party. That Erie did not
completely eliminate the application of the "federal law merchant" which
derived from Swift was shown in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States°
which involved a suit for payment of a forged government check. There, the
Court held that where the right asserted or to be protected arises under the
powers of the federal government, having its origin in federal law, the
"vagaries" of state law are too great and the "desirability of a uniform rule
is plain."" Specifically, the Court held that "application of state law [to
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). In the relevant part of
Swift v. Tyson, supra note 5, at 19, Mr. Justice Story stated:
[Wie have not now the slightest difficulty in holding, that this section [Sec. 34 of
the Act of September 29, 1789, 1 Stat. 92, which relates to the effect of local and
state law in federal courts], upon its true intendment and construction, is
strictly limited to local statutes and local usages .. . and does not extend to
contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation
and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of local tribunals, but
in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.
In essence, Swift stood for the existence of "federal common law," a concept re-
pudiated by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.
7 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra note 6.
B Id. at 78.
9 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
10 Id. at 367. Note that though Clearfield dealt only with commercial paper,
United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944), extended this to all
litigation involving contracts with the United States. In Bank of America v. Parnell, 352
U.S. 29 (1956), the inapplicability of state law was limited to situations where the
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commercial paper issued by the government] .. , would subject the rights
and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. "11
Clearfield, then, while a modification of Swift's scope, calls for the
application of general federal law to avoid the vagaries of state law. This
general federal law was also sought in Swift, where Mr. Justice Story found
his definition of that law chiefly in Etiglish decisions." Mr. Justice Catron,
however, also writing in Swift, perhaps presaged the modern view when he
questioned the majority's use of the English rule in the face of an apparently
uniform trend in the high courts of the states.' 3 Today, in the words of the
instant case, citing Padbloc v. United States, it would seem that "the federal
law to be applied should take account of the best in modern decisions and
discussion,"" whatever its source. The court in Padbloc referred to the long-
term trend in contract law as supporting its decision. This law is to be found
in the reports of the federal courts and state courts, and in the work of com-
petent legal writers. The instant case contends that the best guidelines for
the law to be used today, where federal law is to be applied to commercial
transactions, are found in the uniform state laws, e.g., the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act, the Uniform Sales Act, and the Uniform Commercial Code,
which provide the federal courts with a synthesis of the best modern decisions
and trends in the law. The First Circuit recognized this in Whitin Machine
Works v. United States, 15
 where it applied, by way of dictum, the Uniform
Sales Act." Though the federal government has not adopted these laws, it is
conceivable that more and more cases involving federal commercial trans-
actions will rely upon them."
Returning to the instant case, the Board found that it did not matter
whether the USA, the UCC, or. "federal law merchant" applied, for, in any
case, the appellant was correct. In reaching its decision, however, the Board
closely analyzed •
 the various positions under these three theories and their
applicability. Relying mainly on the acceptance the Code has found in several
states," the Board contended in a strongly worded dictum that the Code
"governs as reflecting the best in modern decision and discussion."" As
government was a party. But see American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961), which held that federal law applies to actions
between a prime contractor for the federal government and a subcontractor. The court
noted however, at 644, that the "development of the law in this area, . .. is still un-
certain and unclear."
11
 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 9, at 367.
12
 Swift v. Tyson, supra note 5, at 20.
13 Id. at 21-2.
14 Reeves Soundcraft Corp., supra note 1, at 14, citing Padbloc v. United States,
No. 523-57 (Ct. Cls. 1963).
15
 175 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1949).
16 
"[Mere is no reason to suppose that . . . federal common law would imply any
warranties more extensive than those spelled out in the Uniform Sales Act. Id. at 507.
. ETThe applicable law in the case at bar is the ... Uniform Sales Act . . . ."
17
 Note, however, that there is a question of how uniform these acts are in light of
the amendments attached to them when enacted into the statutes of the various states.
See Uniform Laws Ann., I U.C.C. ix. (1962).
18
 It had been adopted in twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia, at the
time of the decision.
19
 Reeves Soundcraft Corp., supra note 1, at 15.
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noted," however, if the courts are to apply the Code they must look at it
not only as originally written, but also as adopted and enforced in the
various states.
In summary, the decision in the instant case raises the question of the
future applicability of the UCC in federal courts deciding cases affecting the
rights of the United States. While this decision does not stand for the prop-
osition that the Code must govern, it hopefully indicates that the federal
courts will, in the future, make more use of the UCC.
E. CARL UEHLEIN
Labor Law—Secondary Boycotts—Permissibility of Consumer Picket-
ing—Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 8 (b)
(4) (ii).—NLRB v. Fruit El Vegetable Packers El Warehousemen, Local
760.'—This action was begun on a complaint issued by the Tree Fruits Labor
Relations Committee, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Tree Fruits), on charges
that a strike caused by a dispute over the terms of the renewal of a collective
bargaining agreement with Teamsters, Local 760, constituted such conduct
as would violate Section 8(b) (4), subsections (i) and (ii) of the National
Labor Relations Act (hereafter referred to as the NLRA) as amended by
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act) .2
The case was submitted directly to the National Labor Relations Board
on a stipulation of facts, namely, that Local 760 had called a strike against
the members of Tree Fruits and in support of said strike had instituted a
consumer boycott against the struck product. Local 760 had placed pickets
at the customer entrances of Safeway Retail Stores, distributors of the pro-
duce of the struck firms. The pickets, by placards and handbills, appealed
to Safeway customers, and the public generally, to refrain from purchasing
such struck produce. Care was taken to emphasize that the strike was not
20
 Supra note 17.
1
 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
2
 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141 (1958), as amended by 704(a) of the Labor-
Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 28 U.S.C. 158
(1961 Supp.) reads in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4) (1) ... to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person .. .
to engage in, a strike or a refusal ... to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . . where . . • an object
thereof is-
.
(B) forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with any
other person
. .
Provided further, That . . . nothing contained in such paragraph shall be con-
strued to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public. . . .
125
